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Harold A. Trinkunas, Ph.D.
FINDING A MOMENT in the history of U.S.-Venezuelan relations when tensions between 
the two countries have been worse than at the pres-
ent time is difficult. Some in the U.S. Government 
perceive President Hugo Chávez Frias as uncoop-
erative regarding U.S. regional policies on coun-
ternarcotics, free trade, and support for democracy. 
Venezuela’s alliance with Fidel Castro’s Cuba, its 
opposition to Plan Colombia, and its perceived 
sympathy for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and other radical organizations 
are further irritants to the relationship. On the other 
side. Venezuelan leaders in the Chávez administra-
tion believe the United States is fundamentally 
opposed to the success of the Bolivarian revolution 
and that U.S. hegemony in the current world order 
must be checked. 
Although officials in both countries occasionally 
express hope that relations will improve, this is un-
likely to happen given the perceptions each coun-
try’s foreign policymakers hold of each other.1
Since he was elected president in 1998, Chávez 
has transformed Venezuelan Government and soci-
ety in what he has termed a Bolivarian revolution. 
Based on Chávez’s interpretation of the thinking 
of Venezuelan founding fathers Simón Bolívar and 
Simón Rodríguez, this revolution brings together a 
set of ideas that justifies a populist and sometimes 
authoritarian approach to government, the integra-
tion of the military into domestic politics, and a 
focus on using the state’s resources to serve the 
poor—the president’s main constituency.
The Bolivarian revolution has produced a new 
constitution, a new legislature, a new supreme court 
and electoral authorities, and purges of Venezuela’s 
armed forces and state-owned oil industries. These 
policies consolidated Chavez’s domestic authority 
but generated a great deal of opposition in Ven-
ezuela, including a failed coup attempt in 2002. 
Even so, after his victory in a presidential recall 
referendum during the summer of 2004, Chávez 
seems likely to consolidate his grip on power and 
even win reelection in 2006.
Although the Bolivarian revolution is mostly 
oriented toward domestic politics, it also has an 
important foreign policy component. Bolivarian 
foreign policy seeks to defend the revolution in 
Venezuela; promote a sovereign, autonomous lead-
ership role for Venezuela in Latin America; oppose 
globalization and neoliberal economic policies; and 
work toward the emergence of a multipolar world 
in which U.S. hegemony is checked.2 The revolu-
tion also opposes the war in Iraq and is skeptical 
of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The 
United States has worked fruitfully in the past with 
Venezuela when the country pursued an indepen-
dent foreign policy, but the last three policies run 
directly contrary to U.S. foreign policy preferences 
and inevitably have generated friction between the 
two countries.3
Still, the geopolitics of oil make it difficult for the 
United States and Venezuela to escape their tradition-
al economic and political partnership. The United 
States is Venezuela’s most important consumer of 
its main export—oil. As a market, the United States 
possesses key advantages for Venezuela, such as 
geographic proximity, low transportation costs, and 
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an ever increasing demand for energy. Access to 
large Venezuelan oil deposits across short, secure 
sea lines of communication is undoubtedly a stra-
tegic asset for the United States. Also, the United 
States and Venezuela have often found common 
political ground after Venezuela democratized in 
1958, particularly as the rest of Latin America 
moved away from authoritarianism during the 
1980s and 1990s.
Nevertheless, friction between the United States 
and Venezuela on trade policies, human rights, and 
regional politics is not new. What is different today 
about Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign policy is that 
it seems to be increasingly at odds with the United 
States precisely in the areas that once brought the 
two countries together—oil and democracy.
Venezuela is increasingly ambivalent about its 
role as a key supplier of oil to the United States, 
reaffirming its belief in the importance of the U.S. 
market yet threatening to deny access to oil as a 
strategic lever against U.S. policies. Chávez has 
reinvigorated OPEC, which seemed moribund dur-
ing the 1990s, and he has sought to build direct ties 
to other non-OPEC oil producers, such as Russia, 
and new markets, such as China.
Ironically, just as U.S. President George W. 
Bush’s administration has become more vocal 
about advocating democratization globally, Ven-
ezuela and the United States have fallen out of 
step. Increasingly, Venezuela espouses an alterna-
tive vision of participatory democracy that empha-
sizes mass mobilization and downgrades the role 
of institutions. Venezuela also views U.S. support 
for representative democracy in Latin America as 
thinly disguised meddling. 
To what extent does Venezuela’s Bolivarian for-
eign policy represent a historic break with the past? 
Does it represent a threat to U.S. interests? In some 
ways, current friction between the two countries is 
a replay of earlier disagreements over oil and de-
mocracy. What is new about Chávez’s Bolivarian 
foreign policy is that it has moved beyond Venezu-
ela’s traditional efforts to maintain an independent 
foreign policy and maximize oil revenue to one of 
explicitly seeking out allies in a bid to check U.S. 
power and influence in Latin America. From the 
perspective of U.S. policymakers, this goal might 
seem unfeasible for a country with Venezuela’s 
limited power and resources. Nevertheless, it is the 
main axis of Bolivarian foreign policy.
Cooperation and Conflict 
The strategic importance of Venezuela to the 
United States only truly emerged after the discov-
ery in 1914 of major oil deposits in Venezuela. In 
a sense, the United States was present at the cre-
ation of the Venezuelan oil industry. American oil 
companies and the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation 
created the physical infrastructure for Venezuela 
to become the largest oil exporter in the Western 
Hemisphere. They also were key in shaping Ven-
ezuelan oil legislation and the role this natural 
resource would play in politics. The strategic im-
portance of Venezuelan oil to the United States was 
confirmed during World War II and reconfirmed 
time and again during each political or military 
crisis of the Cold War and beyond.
Despite or perhaps because of these close ties, 
friction arose between Venezuela and the United 
States over the U.S. preference for private owner-
ship of the oil industry in Venezuela, led by interna-
tional corporations, and Venezuela’s preference for 
policies that maximized national control over this 
strategic asset. Beginning in the 1940s, Venezuelan 
democratic governments sought greater access to 
a share of the oil profit, initially through higher 
royalties and taxes but, eventually, by state control 
of the industry itself. Venezuela also promoted its 
views regarding the importance of national control 
of oil production in developing countries through 
its leading role in the creation of OPEC.4 
To the credit of both governments, disagreements 
over oil policy were always resolved peacefully. 
Venezuela developed a reputation as a reliable 
supplier of oil to U.S. markets, particularly in mo-
ments of international crisis. One historic missed 
opportunity, at least from the Venezuelan perspec-
tive, was that the United States never appeared to 
be interested in institutionalizing a special relation-
ship with Venezuela over oil, which they blamed 
on opposition by American oil companies.5
Oil wealth generated during the 1970s allowed 
Venezuela to pursue a more assertive foreign policy 
that often irritated the United States. Venezuela’s 
leading role in OPEC gave it a new prominence 
during the oil crises of the period. Venezuelan Pres-
ident Carlos Andrés Pérez also promoted a Venezu-
elan leadership role in the nonaligned movement, 
which was often critical of U.S. policies.
In 1974, Venezuela reestablished diplomatic 
relations with Cuba.6 Venezuelan support for 
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the overthrow of dictator Anastasio Somoza in 
Nicaragua in 1979 showcased a willingness to 
actively subvert governments once considered 
U.S. allies. Venezuela also sought to contain and 
change U.S. Central American policies during the 
1980s through its leadership role in the Contadora 
group, promoting confidence building and regional 
peace negotiations as alternatives to a more con-
frontational United States stance with Nicaragua 
and Cuba.7
Certainly Venezuelan influence in the region 
during the Cold War, especially when backed by 
abundant oil money, occasionally frustrated U.S. 
designs. But these actions did not preclude frequent 
cooperation between the two countries. After the 
1958 transition to democracy, Venezuela’s political 
leaders were firmly convinced of the importance of 
supporting like-minded governments in the region 
and opposed the Cuban revolution model on both 
ideological and pragmatic grounds. U.S. Presidents 
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson cooper-
ated with the Venezuelans in defeating a Cuban-
backed insurgency in Venezuela during the 1960s. 
United States and Venezuelan militaries developed 
strong mutual security and defense links through 
this experience.
Venezuela’s first leader of the democratic pe-
riod, Rómulo Betancourt, promulgated a doctrine 
of nonrecognition of both leftwing and rightwing 
dictatorships in the Americas. With respect to 
rightwing dictatorships, this was a step too far 
for the United States, which often saw rightwing 
authoritarian regimes as strategic partners in the 
Cold War.8 Venezuela and the United States found 
common ground in El Salvador during the 1980s 
when both provided political support to President 
José Duarte’s Christian Democratic Government. 
Venezuela also provided funding and security 
assistance to assure the survival of the elected 
government of Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua 
after the Sandinista Government ended in 1990. 
More important, the United States cooperated 
extensively with Venezuelan political leaders after 
the 1992 coup attempts to ensure the continuity of 
representative government.9
Until 1998, leaders in both the United States and 
Venezuela understood they had important com-
mon economic interests that required sustaining 
a generally positive bilateral relationship. In addi-
tion, both countries were democracies that valued 
freedom and individual liberty, placing them on 
the same side of the Cold War divide. During this 
period, Venezuela essentially sought to maintain an 
autonomous and sovereign foreign policy, promote 
like-minded democratic governments in the region, 
and moderate U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. 
However, it was also careful not to place itself on a 
collision course with any core U.S. foreign policy 
interests.
Bolivarian Foreign Policy
The current distance in U.S-Venezuelan re-
lations is greater than any gulf between the two 
countries during the 20th century. Even on a 
superficial level, the tone of current government 
exchanges is often unfriendly, personalized, and 
frequently characterized by the use of derogatory 
language.10 This cannot be attributed entirely to 
U.S. policy toward Venezuela or Latin America, 
which differs only at the margins from the param-
eters established by U.S. administrations during 
the 1990s.
At its core, U.S. policy toward the region has 
pushed for free elections, open markets, and free 
trade. The steady trend toward the election of 
center-left governments in Latin America during 
the 2000s has produced little reaction from the 
Bush Administration other than a commitment to 
develop friendly working relations while mostly 
adhering to its basic policies on democracy, mar-
kets, and trade.11 Even the greater willingness of 
the Bush administration to employ military force in 
support of foreign policy and GWOT has not trans-
lated into much of a difference for Latin America. 
The growing U.S. involvement in Colombia is 
only the continuation of a trend established long 
before the 2000 elections in the United States. In 
fact, the great reduction in the use of U.S. military 
force in the region since the end of the Cold War 
is notable when recalling previous U.S. efforts 
during the 1980s in Grenada, Central America, 
and Panama.12
The changing pattern of Venezuela’s foreign 
relations since Chávez’s election, particularly its 
growing closeness to traditional U.S. adversaries 
such as Cuba and Iran and such potential challeng-
ers as Russia and China, disturbs many in the U.S. 
foreign policy establishment. At the same time, the 
Chávez administration is completely convinced 
the United States is hostile to the success of its 
revolution, pointing to the April 2002 coup at-
tempt as evidence, correct or not, of U.S. designs 
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yon its survival. This begs the 
question: What are the aims of 
Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign 
policy, and are they the source 
of the growing political distance 
between the two countries?
Chávez’s first foreign poli-
cy objective was revitalizing 
OPEC, and he has succeeded 
completely, although he did 
benefit from burgeoning de-
mand for energy in China, 
India, and the West. Such an 
objective represents a return 
to Venezuela’s 1970s policy 
of strong support for OPEC. 
Chávez has reached out to all 
other OPEC members whatever 
their politics, even those on 
Washington’s short list of least favorite regimes, 
such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq (before the overthrow 
of the Hussein dictatorship).13
Chavez has also invested a great deal of time 
in building relations with Russia and China, the 
former because of its important oil production 
capacity, the latter because it is perceived as a 
major potential consumer of Venezuelan exports. 
Beyond oil, these two countries are key partners 
in Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign policy because 
they represent alternative sources of technology 
and military equipment, and their decisions to co-
operate with Chávez are unlikely to be influenced 
by U.S. objections. The logical objective of this 
policy is to reduce Venezuelan political, economic, 
and military dependence on the United States. We 
should remember that Venezuela will find it diffi-
cult in the short term to escape its connection to the 
U.S. oil market because the refineries most capable 
of processing the particular variety of heavy crude 
oil increasingly produced in Venezuela are almost 
all located in the United States.14
In Latin America, Venezuela has sought to 
achieve a position of leadership and to rally support 
for regional policies and institutions that exclude 
the United States. One particular area of friction 
has been the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of 
the Americas, to which Chávez has proposed an 
alternative—the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin 
America and the Caribbean.15 He also called for an 
alliance of state oil companies in Latin America, 
called Petrosur, to foster stronger regional integra-
tion in the energy sector. At a hemispheric defense 
ministerial meeting in 2000, the Chávez adminis-
tration unsuccessfully proposed integrating Latin 
American militaries and creating a regional defense 
alliance without U.S. participation.16 These propos-
als fit the Bolivarian theme of regional integration 
and suspicion of the United States.
The Chávez administration has also dissented 
from the regional political trend toward insti-
tutionalizing international policies that defend 
representative democracy in the region, such 
as the Organization of American States (OAS) 
Democratic Charter. Instead, it has showcased 
its own “participatory democracy” as a superior 
alternative. The election of Chilean José Miguel 
Insulza as secretary-general of the OAS with Ven-
ezuelan backing is a limited victory on this issue 
for Chávez.17 Chile has been one of the regional 
countries most supportive of representative democ-
racy and resistant to Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign 
policy, particularly after Chávez’s comments sup-
porting Bolivian access to the Pacific Ocean at 
Chile’s expense. However, the OAS may lower 
the profile of its democracy-promotion activities 
in the future.
In relation to security measures, Venezuela has 
suspended all military-to-military links with the 
United States and has sought alternative sources 
of military expertise and equipment from Brazil, 
China, and Russia. Given the central role the 
Venezuelan officers seated with a U.S. major look over an operations order during 
a U.S. Southern Command exercise in 2001. Venezuela has since severed all 
military-to-military links with the United States. 
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military plays in supporting the Chávez administra-
tion in Venezuela, the United States takes the loss 
of these military-to-military contacts seriously. 
Clearly, Venezuela wants to reduce its dependence 
on the United States in security and foreign policy 
and develop an alternative network of allies.18
 Chávez is now focusing on communicating his 
message more effectively internationally. As part of 
an effort to increase its regional political and com-
munications reach, the Venezuelan Government 
is developing a regional alternative—Telesur—to 
U.S.-owned media outlets such as CNN. Telesur is 
also seen as an important mechanism to circumvent 
the role of privately owned Venezuelan media 
companies, which are perceived as actively hostile 
to the revolution.19
The Venezuelan Government has also provided 
support to sympathizers across the Americas, in the 
United States, and throughout the developed world, 
often sponsoring local Círculos Bolivarianos (Boli-
varian circles) to bring together its supporters over-
seas.20 This has provoked friction with a number of 
neighboring states, which suspect that the Chávez 
administration has aided political groups that are 
either semi-loyal (Bolivia) or disloyal (Colombia) 
to local democratic regimes. In particular, they 
worry that the boom in Venezuelan oil revenues 
might translate into substantial material support for 
forces opposed to the current democratic order in 
the politically volatile Andean Ridge.
Since Chávez came to office, U.S. policymakers 
have expressed concern about Venezuela’s relations 
with Colombia and Cuba. Venezuela has always 
had a tense relationship with Colombia because 
of border disputes and spillover effects of its 
neighbor’s multiple violent insurgencies. Tensions 
have worsened since Chávez became more vocal 
in his opposition to Plan Colombia.
Colombian accusations of Venezuelan material 
and moral support for the FARC have found a sym-
pathetic ear among U.S. policymakers.21 One of the 
most salient indications of how much relations be-
tween the two countries have worsened is the case 
of the kidnapping of FARC leader Rodrigo Granda 
on Venezuelan territory in 2005. The Colombian 
Government paid a reward, allegedly to members 
of the Venezuela security forces, for the delivery 
of Granda to its territory. This led to weeks of ten-
sions between the two countries and a border trade 
embargo by Venezuela against Colombia. Media-
tion efforts by Brazil and other regional powers 
resolved the standoff, but not before revealing the 
lack of sympathy in the region for Colombia and 
its ally, the United States.22
Venezuela also entered a de facto alliance with 
Cuba. Cuban leader Fidel Castro is an important 
political ally for Chávez, and Cuba is a source 
of technical expertise to support the Bolivarian 
revolution. The influx of Cuban doctors, educators, 
sports trainers, and security experts into Venezuela 
helps Chávez’s administration meet the demands 
of its key constituencies. In particular, Cubans 
provide politically reliable personnel to staff new 
government poverty alleviation programs. For 
example, Barrio Adentro places Cuban medical 
personnel in many poor neighborhoods. In return, 
Cuba receives nearly 60,000 barrels of oil a day, 
either on favorable payment terms or as a form of 
trade in kind.23 Given the longstanding hostility 
between Washington and Havana, it is not sur-
prising that the new Caracas-Havana alliance has 
generated suspicions in the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment.
The Bottom Line
Venezuelan and U.S. national interests have 
never been identical. We should expect disagree-
ment even in a relationship historically character-
ized by the mutual interdependence generated 
by oil, but when it comes to Chávez’s Bolivarian 
foreign policy, politics trumps economics. Chávez 
seems likely to win reelection in 2006, and 
it appears he will be around for a considerable 
period of time, which puts the United States in a 
bind when it comes to dealing with the Bolivarian 
revolution. 
A policy of engagement, which is what the 
U.S. Government attempted in the first 2 years of 
Chávez’s administration, appears unlikely to gener-
ate a solid working relationship given Venezuela’s 
Bolivarian foreign policy objectives. The United 
States’ efforts to work with Venezuela since 1998, 
even on such noncontroversial issues as disaster 
relief, have met with rejection. However, there ap-
pears to be little sympathy, in Latin America and 
internationally, for a policy of confrontation with 
the Venezuelan Government. International reaction 
to the 2002 coup in Venezuela and the reaction in 
Latin America to the Venezuela-Colombia crisis 
over Granda’s kidnapping confirm this. If Wash-
ington pursues such a diplomatic policy toward 
Chávez, he has already demonstrated that the likely 
LATIN AMERICA
 July-August 2005  MILITARY REVIEW 44
outcome would be the isolation of Washington and 
its regional allies—not of Venezuela.
Washington’s dilemma does not mean Venezu-
ela’s Bolivarian foreign policy is likely to succeed 
to any great extent. Venezuela has achieved its 
minimum foreign policy objective—the defense 
of the revolution. However, its leadership role in 
Latin America is still limited at best, and its ef-
forts to construct alternative regional institutions 
have failed. Brazil still remains South America’s 
leading power with long-established ambitions of 
its own.
Venezuela has succeeded in revitalizing OPEC, 
although worldwide demand for energy in the 
2000s was likely to provide this opportunity even 
in the absence of Chávez’s leadership. Venezuela’s 
alliance with Cuba serves mostly to strengthen the 
Chávez administration in domestic rather than in-
ternational politics. Despite Venezuelan opposition 
to Plan Colombia, the Colombian state has become 
stronger and better prepared to deal with violent 
nonstate actors within its territory, and the FARC 
has lost ground since Chávez came to power.
Venezuela’s new alliances with Russia and 
China are unlikely to produce much in the way 
of military advantage for this country vis à vis 
its neighbors, particularly in light of Colombia’s 
growing strength. Even the development of alter-
native markets for Venezuelan oil exports seems 
difficult to justify on anything other than political 
grounds since the economics of oil so strongly 
favor a U.S.-Venezuelan trade relationship.
A final question remains. Will Venezuela’s new 
political model be emulated across the region? 
This seems unlikely. The Bolivarian revolution, 
which is not a coherent ideological model that 
can be replicated in other countries, depends on 
Chávez’s personality, charisma, and drive. The 
Bolivarian revolution increasingly depends on dis-
tributing large amounts of oil income to serve key 
constituencies in Venezuela. Other Latin American 
countries lack such resources, and in the past have 
not had much success at redistributing wealth. 
This does not mean, however, that the underlying 
sources of political volatility in Latin America, 
such as poverty, extreme income inequality, and 
poor economic policies, will soon disappear. Much 
to the consternation of Washington, governments 
that sympathize with some elements of the new 
Venezuelan foreign policy will emerge, particularly 
in the Andean region where democracy seems most 
vulnerable.  MR
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